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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF AN AUDITOR’S COMMUNICATION MODE AND 
PROFESSIONAL TONE ON CLIENT RESPONSES TO AUDIT INQUIRIES 
MAY 2014 
AARON SAIEWITZ, B.S., FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Thomas Kida 
Recent audit research has indicated that junior auditors tend to use e-mail for 
client inquiries. Additionally, audit firms have expressed concerns regarding the ability of 
junior auditors to communicate professionally. In this study, I investigate whether 
receiving an auditor inquiry via e-mail differentially affects client responses as compared 
to more traditional modes of inquiry and whether those responses are affected by the 
auditor’s professional tone. In an experiment, experienced business professionals respond 
to a request for information from an auditor regarding a potential accounting adjustment. 
I varied the communication mode of the request (e-mail, audio, or visual) and the 
professional tone of the communication (more vs. less professional tone) and then 
measured the extent to which participants revealed information that either supported or 
did not support the client’s accounting position. I find that an auditor e-mail inquiry 
results in client responses that are more biased towards items that support the client’s 
position as compared to audio or visual inquiries. In addition, I find that clients respond 
in a more biased manner when the inquiry is worded in a less professional tone as 
compared to a more professional tone and that this tendency may be exacerbated when 
they receive the request via e-mail. Further underscoring the implications of these 
ix 
 
findings for audit outcomes, I find that clients are less likely to agree with an auditor’s 
proposed income-decreasing adjustment if the client did not personally reveal applicable 
information to the auditor.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, audit firms have become concerned about the propensity of junior 
auditors to use e-mail for communication with client personnel (May and May 2012). 
“Millennials” (those born since 1980) have grown up utilizing computer-based 
communication technology and are often most comfortable with sending abbreviated, 
text-based messages (Lancaster and Stillman 2010). In addition, recent research in the 
auditing literature demonstrates that younger professionals use e-mail for client inquiries 
in order to avoid uncomfortable interactions with more senior client personnel (Bennett 
and Hatfield 2013).  
Messier et al. (2012) note that auditors discover a great deal of information via 
direct inquiry with client personnel. Trompeter and Wright (2010) confirm that client 
inquiry is a frequently-used method for gathering information regarding unusual 
fluctuations and potential risk areas. They further note that client inquiry is often 
conducted by lower-level staff. While younger professionals may be more comfortable 
with using e-mail to inquire with client personnel (Bennett and Hatfield 2013), no prior 
research has considered whether there are adverse effects on client responses to e-mail 
inquiries.  
Another concern regarding the client inquiry process is that junior auditors may 
lack appropriate professional communication skills (Jackson 2012; Jones 2011). 
Experienced business professionals consider it important to use an appropriate tone in a 
professional business context (Jones 2011). However, communicating in a professional 
2 
 
tone is an acquired skill that many professionals may lack at the beginning of their career 
(Dixon et al. 2010; Calvert and Kurji 2012). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how an auditor’s choice of 
communication mode for client inquiries affects the content of the client’s response, as 
well as whether client responses can be affected by the professional tone of the inquiry. I 
also investigate whether a client’s subsequent agreement with a proposed audit 
adjustment can be affected by the client’s earlier response to the audit inquiry.  
 
Communication Mode 
Prior audit research indicates that electronic communication can have both 
beneficial and detrimental effects. Bennett and Hatfield (2013) find that junior staff 
auditors are more likely to request information from senior clients if the junior auditors 
are allowed to use e-mail for the request, as opposed to having to make a face-to-face 
(F2F) request, since e-mail allows the junior auditors to avoid uncomfortable social 
interactions with more senior clients. Additionally, Lynch et al. (2009) find that 
brainstorming sessions held in an electronic format lead to an increase in the number of 
relevant fraud risks identified when compared to F2F brainstorming. On the other hand, 
Brazel et al. (2004) demonstrate that auditors who anticipate F2F review exert more 
effort and are more effective than those who expect e-review or no review. They suggest 
that their results are due to increased perceptions of accountability when anticipating F2F 
review.  
While the above research has considered the effects of different modes of 
communication on auditor performance, no research has considered the impact of these 
3 
 
choices on client responses. This aspect is important because there are audit situations in 
which inquiry reveals previously unknown information (Messier et al. 2012; Trompeter 
and Wright 2010). While Bennett and Hatfield’s (2013) finding that younger staff 
auditors are more willing to ask for additional information via e-mail suggests a benefit 
of e-mail use for audit inquiries, if client personnel react in a biased manner to e-
communication, the benefit may be eliminated or may be negative overall, ultimately 
affecting audit outcomes.  
A biased reaction may arise as a result of defensive bolstering, a process in which 
individuals feel compelled to defend a position to someone whom they feel accountable 
(Tetlock et al. 1989). In an audit context, a client likely feels accountable to an auditor 
while at the same time the client has an incentive to maintain commitment to their pre-
existing accounting positions, with the knowledge that the auditor is typically seeking a 
more conservative position (i.e., typically income-reducing). Accordingly, the client may 
feel compelled to defend their position and may bias their responses by revealing more 
information that supports their position and/or less information that does not support their 
position (cf. Chaiken et al. 1996).  
Defensive bolstering may be more pronounced in response to an e-mail inquiry as 
compared to an audio or visual inquiry. Suh (1999) notes that audio and visual 
communications include more cues than written communications, including nonverbal 
cues such as body-language and physical appearance, as well as vocal inflection. 
Defensive bolstering is an effortful process that generally requires that the individual has 
the capacity to engage in systematic processing (Chaiken et al. 1996; Eagly 2007). The 
additional cues present in an audio or visual interaction can be distracting (Suh 1999) and 
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can therefore result in a taxing of cognitive resources (cf. Ferran and Watts 2008; 
Sussman and Siegal 2003), reducing the ability to engage in defensive bolstering.  
In addition, Swaab et al. (2012) note that audio and visual interactions involve 
greater social presence than e-communication, leading to greater cooperation and 
information sharing between negotiating parties. When a party is less cooperative, they 
are more likely to withhold information that can aid the other party. Accordingly, social 
presence theory (Short 1974; see also Elliott et al. 2012) would lead to similar 
predictions. Based on these theories, F2F and phone inquiries should result in client 
responses that are not as heavily weighted towards information that supports a client’s 
position as compared to an e-mail.   
E-mail represents a relatively recent innovation for client inquiry, and I propose 
that e-mail requests lead to more biased responses from clients as compared to requests 
using more traditional modes of communication (e.g., F2F and phone). Of course, client 
inquiries may be made by any of these methods. As a result, I also investigate whether an 
audio-only request leads to any difference from a visual request. Prior research suggests 
that additional cues found in visual communication may become distracting. Suh (1999) 
finds that in some situations phone can lead to better outcomes than F2F because 
individuals focus more on the task than the appearance of the sender. Alternatively, 
increased social presence in a F2F context may lead to superior outcomes as compared to 
a phone context (Short 1974). Further, Daft and Lengel (1986) suggest there may be no 
difference for a relatively simple request. Accordingly, it is unclear whether responses to 
F2F and phone requests will differ, and I explore the possibility in this study. 
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Professional Tone 
Professionalism is a fairly broad construct (Carr and Stefaniak 2012). Cheney and 
Ashcraft (2007) describe many variations of the term “professional” in both research and 
popular culture. One aspect they describe is the need to perform in a manner that implies 
rationality rather than emotionality including, in an extreme example, suppressing 
spontaneity and individuality. Kramer and Hess (2002) discuss that acting professional 
often requires acting in a manner different from social, non-professional situations. In 
general, Cheney and Ashcraft (2007) note that professionalism can serve to subjugate 
individuals to established, dominant norms. As such, use of a less professional tone may 
be viewed by experienced professionals as norm-violating.  
Consistent with this, Carr and Stefaniak (2012) find that professional tone in e-
mail communications has an effect on perceptions of credibility. They note that 
“managers consider basic writing mechanics an essential job skill, even more so than 
most computer competencies in increasingly wired organizations.” Jessmer and Anderson 
(2001) find that e-mail senders who are impolite or use poor grammar are viewed as less 
competent than those who are polite and use proper grammar. Regarding specific 
professional behavior, Waner (1995) found that business professionals believe that using 
an appropriate tone of voice for the context is a very important interpersonal skill. 
Recently, Jones (2011) found that accounting managers rate “appropriate level of tone 
and formality” in communications as very important. In addition, they generally are not 
satisfied with staff accountants’ performance in this area. Compounding this problem, 
older firm personnel believe, and research confirms, that younger staff overestimate their 
communication skills, both written and oral (Ernst & Young 2008; Jackson 2012). 
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Research into the effects of norm violations suggests that experienced 
professionals may have aversive reactions to a violation of professional communication 
norms. Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) suggest that willingness to comply with a request 
could be affected by whether the request is norm-violating. In addition, Brauer and 
Chekroun (2005) note that a negative response to a norm violation could be an expression 
of social control, in which the perceiver expresses disapproval in response to a norm 
violation. This does not necessarily need to be a direct reprimand, but could instead be an 
aversive reaction (Brauer and Chekroun 2005). In effect, if a young auditor 
communicates in a less professional tone, this norm violation may cause the client to 
become less cooperative and, therefore, reveal less information that is beneficial to the 
auditor’s goals (i.e., the client may provide a response set that is more biased towards the 
client’s position). 
While the effects for professional tone can occur in any type of communication 
mode, it may be more pronounced for an e-mail inquiry. Individuals may pay closer 
attention to the wording used in an e-mail than in a spoken conversation because e-mails 
do not have visual cues or vocal inflection cues that could distract the individual (Cheshin 
et al. 2011; Suh 1999). In addition, individuals may be more willing to accept a less 
professional conversational tone with phone or F2F communication because these modes 
are, by their nature, conversational. As a result, it is not unreasonable to expect that the 
effects for professional tone may be exacerbated for e-mail inquiry and attenuated for 
audio and visual inquiry, although the extent of such exacerbation and attenuation is 
unclear. 
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Agreement with an Auditor’s Proposed Adjustment 
Trompeter and Wright (2010) raise concerns regarding whether auditors 
adequately search for corroborating evidence based on client responses to auditor 
inquiries. In particular, they note that auditors may focus on confirming evidence and 
may not adequately search for disconfirming evidence. Therefore, if a client provides a 
response that is more biased towards items that support their position, auditors may 
inadequately search for contradictory evidence and could fail to uncover the issue. Of 
course, inquiry is not the only audit technique used to uncover information. The relevant 
issues could be uncovered via alternative procedures such as tests of transactions and 
balances, analytical procedures, reading industry and economic news, and even inquiries 
with other personnel. However, there are many scenarios in which inquiry would be a 
likely way to learn of an issue, including inventory obsolescence and contingent 
liabilities. Alternatively, even if the staff auditor fails to uncover the issue, it is possible 
that it could be unearthed during the review process. However, the staff auditor may 
stylize the documentation of the client response in a manner that makes it more difficult 
for the reviewer to determine that the interaction between the auditor and the client was 
inadequate (Ricchiute 1999; Yip-Ow and Tan 2000; Bennett and Hatfield 2013).  
To investigate whether communication mode and professional tone could have an 
overall effect on audit outcomes even if the issue is discovered via alternative procedures, 
I also investigate whether the extent of bias in a client’s response affects their willingness 
to agree with an auditor’s proposed income-decreasing adjustment to the financial 
statements. Information that the client has personally revealed to the auditor should be 
more familiar to the client. Claypool et al. (2004) demonstrate that information that has 
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greater familiarity and more personal relevance is more likely to be accepted by an 
individual (see also Garcia-Marques and Mackie 2001). Accordingly, I expect that 
agreement with a proposed adjustment will be affected by the degree to which the 
auditor’s justification for the adjustment derives from information provided by the 
participant in their response to the first request.  
  
Overview of the Study 
In this study, experienced business professionals, most with managerial 
experience, assumed the role of a client manager who receives an inquiry related to a 
potential inventory obsolescence problem. The request was either presented in the form 
of an e-mail, an audio-only request, or a visual request, and the wording of the inquiry 
was either more or less professional in tone.  
Participants were asked to respond to the inquiry based on previously provided 
background information. Included in this information were nine items that supported the 
client’s position of no inventory obsolescence, and nine items that did not support that 
position and, in fact, suggested that there was an obsolescence problem. With the 
assistance of two independent coders, the responses were analyzed to determine which 
items of information the participants revealed. The main dependent variable analyzed was 
the net number of items revealed that supported a write-down of inventory less the 
number of items revealed that did not support a write-down. As such, a lower value of net 
items revealed indicated a response that was more biased towards items that support the 
client’s position that no write-down is necessary.  
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After providing their responses, participants were told that the audit team has 
determined that there is an inventory obsolescence problem and the auditors are 
proposing a material write-down of the inventory value. Participants were then asked 
how strongly they agree or disagree with the auditor’s proposed adjustment, whether they 
would accept the adjustment outright and, if not, the amount they think the company 
should counterpropose, as well as the maximum acceptable adjustment.  
After completing the experimental tasks, participants were asked several 
questions related to their reactions to, and impressions of, the junior auditor and the entire 
audit team. They were then asked several questions related to experience with technology 
and their attitudes regarding several technology and communication issues, as well as 
questions related to attitudes regarding power distance (House et al. 2004). Finally, 
participants provided demographic data, including age, gender, and years of business and 
managerial experience.  
 
Preview of the Results 
I find that participants provide responses that are more biased towards items that 
support their position when receiving an e-mail request than when receiving an audio or 
visual request. In addition, participants provide responses that are more biased towards 
items that support their position when receiving a less professionally vs. a more 
professionally worded inquiry. The results suggest that the effect of a less professional 
tone may be exacerbated in response to an e-mail and/or attenuated in response to audio 
or visual inquiries. Supplemental analysis reveals that the effect of professional tone on 
bias in the client’s response is mediated by perceptions of the professionalism of the 
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auditor’s request, but only in the e-mail condition, suggesting the norm violation only 
triggers a response when salient. Further, an additional study comparing experienced 
business professionals and senior undergraduate business majors reveals that the 
difference in professionalism was only perceived by the experienced participants and, 
accordingly, only the experienced participants had responses that were more biased 
towards items that supported their position when receiving a less professionally worded 
request as compared to a more professionally worded request. Finally, I find that clients 
are less likely to agree with an auditor’s proposed income-reducing adjustment if the 
client previously provided a response that was more biased towards items that support 
their position.  
This research has implications for both practice and theory. From a practice 
standpoint, my findings provide evidence that communication mode and the 
professionalism of the communication can have ramifications for audit outcomes. In 
particular, the trend of young auditors using e-mail for client inquiries increases the 
likelihood that clients will provide an information set more biased towards items that 
support the client’s position. This has several implications for the audit process. As 
mentioned above, Trompeter and Wright (2010) note that inquiry is often a prominent 
source for investigating potential audit issues. Further, they note a concern regarding 
whether auditors adequately corroborate client responses to audit inquiries and, in 
particular, whether auditors adequately seek disconfirming evidence. Accordingly, if 
clients provide biased responses, Trompeter and Wright’s (2010) findings suggest that 
auditors may fail to discover disconfirming evidence, suggesting that the biased 
responses found in my study could impact audit outcomes. Additionally, my finding that 
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clients who provide more biased responses are less likely to agree with an auditor’s 
proposed income-decreasing adjustment and plan to negotiate more aggressively with the 
auditor is important because prior research shows that this resistance could result in a less 
conservative adjustment (cf. Hatfield et al. 2010; Brown-Liburd and Wright 2011). 
Accordingly, the factors investigated in my study may have an effect on audit outcomes 
even if the issues are uncovered via alternative means such as tests of transactions and 
balances, reading industry and economic news, or even inquiries with other personnel. 
With respect to theory, this study provides evidence on the relationship of mode of 
communication and defensive bolstering, and also suggests that an aversive reaction to 
professional norm violations could include increased defensive bolstering.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, I first review the literature on the audit inquiry process. I then 
review relevant literature related to communication mode and professional tone. I also 
provide an overview of research investigating the client side of auditor-client 
negotiations. Where applicable, I provide an overview of relevant psychological theories.   
 
Audit Inquiry 
Audit inquiry refers to an auditor requesting information directly from a client or 
asking questions about events related to the period under audit. For example, an auditor 
may ask for explanations regarding unusual or unexpected relationships noted in 
analytical procedures, or an auditor may inquire about the effects of certain economic 
events. Of course, inquiry by itself is generally not sufficient audit evidence. At least on a 
test basis, auditors should vouch and trace source documents, observe and inspect 
documents and physical assets, and observe and reperform client procedures. However, 
Messier et al. (2012) note that a great deal of information is discovered by auditors via 
direct inquiry with client personnel. Audit executives have confirmed that often they 
discover issues simply by talking with clients.1  
Further, Trompeter and Wright (2010) note that inquiry is the most commonly 
used method to initially investigate significant or unusual fluctuations in analytical 
procedures. Trompeter and Wright (2010) interviewed 36 auditors of varying levels and 
                                                            
1 Audit executives have stated this in various panel sessions at American Accounting Association meetings. 
Additionally, I was told this directly by several audit executives in personal conversations. 
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found that 86% stated that the first step they take in response to unexpected differences 
found in analytical procedures is to ask the client for an explanation.2 In addition, a 
disconcerting finding was that 31% of interviewees did not indicate searching for 
corroborating evidence. Further, the interviewees indicated that they are only searching 
for disconfirming evidence 28% of the time, indicating that the majority of the time they 
are searching only for confirming evidence. This confirmation bias regarding client 
responses to audit inquiries echoed earlier findings by Hirst and Koonce (1996), who also 
interviewed auditors of varying levels. In many of their interviews, auditors talked about 
inquiring with clients for explanations to unusual fluctuations in substantive analytical 
procedures. In those cases, all of the auditors indicated that they primarily searched for 
corroborating evidence. Hirst and Koonce point out that the auditors “also noted that they 
do not normally seek information that contradicts or refutes explanations, unless 
information comes to their attention indicating an explanation may not be valid” (p. 474).  
Based on this, and based on Trompeter and Wright’s (2010) consistent finding, a concern 
arises that if an auditor seeks an explanation from a client and the client responds in a 
manner that is biased away from disconfirming items, the auditor may fail to adequately 
seek disconfirming evidence. 
There are a limited number of studies that have investigated the effects of audit 
inquiry, and none to my knowledge have tested ways to alter inquiry to improve the 
degree to which clients reveal information to the auditors. Kaplan et al. (2011) conducted 
an experiment in which one of the factors investigated was the presence or absence of an 
                                                            
2 When asked “When would you not ask a client for an explanation?”, 61% of the interviewees said “never 
or rarely,” 31% said that they would instead first generate their own explanations, and 22% said that they 
would not go to the client if fraud was suspected.  
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inquiring auditor. They found that managers were more likely to report fraud when an 
auditor asked if the participant was aware of any fraud (as required by SAS No. 99). 
Specifically, the results indicated that the participants were significantly more likely to 
intend to report a fraud in the presence of an inquiring auditor than a non-inquiring 
auditor.3 Other studies of the auditor-client inquiry process have primarily focused on the 
auditor’s side of the inquiry process. Lee and Welker (2007) use students to proxy for 
entry-level auditors and find that students are unable to identify fraud via inquiry, even 
after training in inquiry methods. Liu (2012) looks at how certain decision aids can 
improve the way in which staff auditors plan to conduct client inquiries.  
In summary, the literature suggests that inquiry is commonly used, and is 
sometimes a primary vehicle for discovering information from the client. In particular, 
concerns arise regarding whether auditors adequately corroborate information discovered 
during client inquiry and, in particular, whether they adequately search for disconfirming 
evidence. Prior research has primarily focused on the auditor side of the inquiry process, 
and very little research has investigated how to obtain a more useful information set from 
clients via inquiry.  
 
Communication Mode 
Prior research into the effects of different modes of communication has often 
centered around normative theories (Postmes et al. 2000). Daft and Lengel (1986) 
proposed Media Richness Theory (MRT) which posits that media “richness,” i.e., the 
                                                            
3 The dependent variable in Kaplan et al.’s (2011) study was intention to report, rather than an actual action 
to report. Sheeran (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of research looking at the correlation of intentions and 
actions, finding a fairly high correlation (r=.52). My dissertation looks at actual reporting actions by clients, 
rather than reporting intentions. 
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depth of its cues, the degree to which it can be reprocessed, and the speed at which 
feedback occurs (“synchronicity”), guides both choice to utilize a particular 
communication media and qualities of outcomes related to the choice of media. The 
communication mode with the greatest richness would be face-to-face interaction, 
followed by video-conferencing, telephone conversations, direct written communications 
(which would include e-mail), and general publications (e.g., a report that is not specific 
to an individual or organization). Under MRT, richer media leads to lower degrees of 
equivocality and is best when overall task ambiguity is high. When task ambiguity is low, 
media that is low in richness should be adequate under MRT, particularly when the task 
lacks complexity (Daft and Lengel 1986).  
However, while MRT has been extensively applied in the literature, support has 
been mixed or poor (Suh 1999; King and Xia 1997). A common criticism of MRT is that 
it represents a normative, rational model that does not take into account social 
psychological influences (Fulk et al. 1987; Kock 2005). Fulk et al. (1987) criticize 
MRT’s implication that modes of communication have certain objective characteristics, 
e.g., richness, synchronicity, and so forth, and that these characteristics are invariant to 
users’ subjective views or social contexts. To address this perceived shortcoming, Fulk et 
al. proposed a social information processing theory (SIPT) of media use that suggests 
meaning is “socially constructed” and that “perceived properties vary by user and social 
context of use” (Fulk et al. 1987). Fulk et al. note that MRT also suggests that the 
objective properties of different forms of media are equally salient to all users and that 
user choice of media is the result of an “objectively rational” decision process. With 
social information processing theory, Fulk et al. (1987) state that saliency is affected by 
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social cues from others and that media choices are “retrospectively and subjectively 
rational.” 
Recently, Swaab et al. (2012) have proposed a communication model that 
incorporates MRT, SIPT, and Social Presence Theory (Short 1974). This model suggests 
that communication modes with greater levels of social presence (i.e., awareness that a 
human being is making the request) will lead to more cooperation when the content of the 
communication is consistent with the recipient’s aims, but will lead to less cooperation 
vs. communication modes that involve less social presence (e.g., e-mail) when the 
content is detrimental. Further, common social categories will lead to more cooperation, 
while different social categories will lead to less cooperation. Finally, under this model, 
when a pre-existing cooperative social relationship exists, communication mode may not 
have a differential effect on negotiation outcomes or group decision tasks.4 Swaab et al. 
conducted a meta-analysis of communication studies to support this model.  
In the auditing literature, Nöteberg, Benford, and Hunton (2003) proposed a 
media task-fit model for auditor-client interactions based on MRT, in which rich media is 
necessary only when the task demands higher richness (e.g., a task with high ambiguity). 
To test this model, Nöteberg and Hunton (2005) conducted an experiment in which 
auditors received an explanation for an audit issue and then measured the degree to which 
the auditors accepted the client’s explanation. They find that auditors pay closer attention 
to a client’s explanation in e-mail form and are more accepting of the client’s argument 
                                                            
4 This current study does not investigate the effects of a pre-existing relationship. Bennett and Hatfield 
(2013) would suggest that junior auditors do not typically develop a close relationship with more senior 
clients, particularly as they may feel intimidated by more senior clients. Future research can investigate the 
effects of social relationship on a client’s propensity to reveal information to an auditor, as well as effects 
on the auditor’s professional skepticism.  
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compared to F2F, although in their experiment the opposite occurred when participants 
had repeated exposure to the message, suggesting that repeated F2F persuasion attempts 
may lead to greater acceptance of client arguments vs. repeated attempts via e-mail.5 
Bennett and Hatfield (2013) conducted an experiment in which graduate level 
auditing students  proxied for new staff auditors and were required to use either e-mail or 
F2F to inquire with a senior client or a younger client, played by confederates. Their 
study revealed a benefit of e-mail use in that participants were more likely to ask for 
additional information from the client if they were able to do so in e-mail rather than F2F. 
This did not fully eliminate the negative effects of a junior auditor interacting with a 
senior client, but it was beneficial.  
All other communication mode research in auditing has looked at the effects of 
different communication modes within audit teams. Brazel et al. (2004) examined the 
effects of anticipating electronic review (e-review) vs. F2F review. Participants were told 
that they would be reviewed either via e-mail or in a F2F meeting. Participants in the e-
review condition exerted less effort and were less accurate in their documentation as 
opposed to those in the F2F condition. E-review results did not statistically differ from a 
control condition in which the participants were not told to expect any review. Brazel et 
al. suggest that anticipation of F2F review leads to stronger feelings of accountability and 
                                                            
5 In a study that investigates differences in investment decisions based on receiving a restatement 
announcement via video or text, Elliott et al. (2012) find that when a CEO offers an internal attribution for 
the restatement (i.e., accepts responsibility), social presence in a video leads to greater trusting by the 
investors as compared to a text-only announcement. In contrast, when the CEO blames external factors for 
the restatement, the opposite occurs and social presence in the video leads to lower levels of trust and lower 
willingness to invest compared to a text announcement. This is not inconsistent with Nöteberg and Hunton 
(2005) who suggest that peripheral cues in their study may have conflicted with the message (e.g., the 
client looked very professional and organized, yet provided a weak argument). This contradiction of 
peripheral (nonverbal) and central (wording) cues led to greater rejection of the client’s argument vs. a text-
only explanation (although only when there was no repeat exposure), comparable to Elliott et al.’s (2012) 
finding that denial of responsibility led to less trust and lower investment decisions in response to a video 
vs. a text-only announcement.  
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therefore greater effort occurs. In a study of auditor brainstorming teams, Lynch et al. 
(2009) find that electronic brainstorming leads to identification of more relevant fraud 
risks as compared to F2F brainstorming. They posit that this is because of a reduction in 
production blocking.  
In summary, the general communications literature is still debating the 
appropriateness of various models of communication mode use and effects. The auditing 
literature has not deeply investigated the effects of communication modes, but research to 
date has shown that in some situations, electronic communication can be beneficial (e.g., 
Lynch et al. 2009; Bennett and Hatfield 2013), whereas in others it can be detrimental 
(e.g., Brazel et al. 2004) or mixed (Nöteberg and Hunton 2005).  
 
Defensive Bolstering 
Along with the aforementioned communication theories, differences could arise in 
responses to different communication media based on varying levels of ability to engage 
in defensive bolstering. When an individual is committed to a particular position, and is 
accountable to another party, the individual is likely to engage in a process known as 
bolstering (Tetlock et al. 1989). This is relevant to an audit context because a client is 
accountable to an auditor, and is also likely committed to their own pre-existing 
accounting positions. The client typically is aware that the auditor is seeking a more 
conservative position (i.e., typically income-reducing), while the client typically seeks to 
report higher income. As a result, the client may engage in bolstering, and can do so by 
biasing their responses towards information that supports their position (cf. Chaiken et al. 
1996).  
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Prior research has shown that defensive bolstering is a cognitively taxing process 
that requires greater cognitive resources (Eagley 2007). This is because it requires effort 
to consider the impact of each item an individual conveys to the other party in order to 
ensure that the item does not damage the individual’s pre-existing position. In contrast, it 
is a relatively easy process to provide information without evaluation or to simply 
provide information that is consistent with the other party’s views (Tetlock et al. 1989). 
In the context of different communication modes, defensive bolstering should decrease in 
response to a phone or F2F request as compared to an e-mail request due to the presence 
of additional “cues.” For example, both phone and F2F include vocal inflection (e.g., tone 
of voice), while F2F also includes visual cues (e.g., nonverbal gestures, appearance, etc.) 
(Suh 1999).  In comparison, an e-mail request includes only words. The additional cues 
in phone and F2F may increase cognitive load (cf. Ferran and Watts 2008; Sussman and 
Siegal 2003), reducing the ability to engage in defensive bolstering. 
Several studies demonstrate a reduction of defensive bolstering when cognitive 
resources are depleted. Fischer et al. (2007) conducted several experiments to investigate 
the effects of resource depletion on self-evaluations. They found that individuals with 
depleted resources present a less-optimistic self appraisal and are more pessimistic about 
their future. Particularly relevant for the current study, depleted individuals provided less 
positive descriptions of their personal attributes, demonstrating a reduction of bolstering 
participants’ self-image. In a similar study, Fischer and his colleagues found that 
distracting participants during decision making leads to more balanced information 
processing (Fischer et al. 2010). Fischer et al. (2010) posit that this occurs because 
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distraction leads participants to exhibit less confidence in their judgments and to hold 
their decision preference less strongly, decreasing confirmatory biases.  
Along the same lines, Jonas et al. (2005) investigated whether individuals who 
provide information as an advisor rather than for themselves will engage in defensive 
bolstering. They found that when an individual is an advisor for someone else’s decision, 
they engaged in a more balanced information search than individuals who make a 
decision for themselves. However, if the individuals as advisors were asked to make a 
decision for their clients, they “revealed an increased preference for information 
supporting their position.” While Jonas et al. (2005) did not test the effects of 
distraction/cognitive load in this study, they did demonstrate that even a third party will 
engage in defensive bolstering if they are adequately involved in the ultimate decision.  
 Together, these studies on defensive bolstering, along with social presence theory 
in the communication mode literature, suggest that audit requests via e-mail vs. F2F and 
phone will lead to differential responses from clients.  
 
Professional Tone 
Cheney and Ashcraft (2007) provide a review of the literature on professionalism 
in communication studies. They note that there are many aspects to professionalism and 
that professionalism is setting-dependent. Generally, they state that in a business setting, 
professionalism generally involves subjugating individuals to dominant norms, and 
suppressing “spontaneity, emotionality, and individuality” (p. 162). Much of the research 
in this area is survey based, although some experiments have been conducted.  
21 
 
Many accounting professionals view appropriate professional communication to 
include proper writing. Jones (2011) surveyed accounting managers regarding the 
importance of certain communication skills, as well as their satisfaction with new staff 
auditors’ performance in each of these areas. The following writing and communication 
skills were the three highest ranked in importance: “Organizes information into effective 
sentences and paragraphs,” “Writes clearly and precisely,” and “Produces correctly 
spelled documents.” However, the first two were among the three items (out of over 25 
items) where the managers were the least satisfied. This indicates that proper writing is 
perceived as a problematic area by accounting managers. Compounding this problem, 
additional surveys show senior firm personnel believe that younger professionals 
overestimate their communication skills (Ernst & Young 2008). Jackson (2012), in a 
survey of business undergraduates, confirms that new professionals are overconfident in 
their abilities when compared to prior assessments by experienced professionals. 
Carr and Stefaniak (2012) conducted an experiment investigating the kinds of 
judgments a recipient of a less professionally worded e-mail will make about the sender. 
Student participants reviewed a fictional recruiting e-mail from an HR Director at an 
accounting firm to the class instructor. The e-mail was either properly written or 
contained extensive spelling, grammar, and punctuation errors. When the e-mail was 
written poorly, the participants generally viewed the sender as less credible and 
competent, and having less organizational prestige. However, this effect was mitigated 
simply by adding “Sent from my iPhone” to the bottom of the message, indicating that if 
the participants saw this they were more forgiving of errors since it is harder to correct 
errors on an iPhone.  
22 
 
Another aspect of professionalism is politeness and formality. Waner (1995) and 
Jones (2011) both found that professionals believe it is important to use a proper tone and 
formality in professional communications. Jessmer and Anderson (2001) conducted a 
within-subjects experiment asking undergraduates to assess characteristics of the sender 
based on whether the communication was polite or impolite, and whether the message 
contained proper or improper grammar. Proper grammar and politeness both led 
participants to view the sender as more competent. Additionally, participants were more 
likely to want to work with a sender who was either more polite or who had better 
grammar in their communication.  
However, while all these studies investigated perceptions regarding certain 
aspects of professionalism (proper tone, politeness, writing skills), no study to my 
knowledge has investigated whether a less professional communication can lead to 
changes in performance outcomes, a gap in the literature that this dissertation addresses.  
 
Norm Violations 
Because professionalism involves adherence to certain norms of behavior and 
communication (Cheney and Ashcraft 2007), it is possible that experienced professionals 
may view a less professional communication as norm violating. The literature on norm 
violations suggests that this can lead to an aversive reaction. This may be in the form of 
less cooperativeness (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) or disapproval and attempts to 
reprimand or control the norm violating behavior (Brauer and Chekroun 2005).  
Much of the research in this area involves evaluations of the norm-violating 
communicator, rather than investigating behavior towards the communicator (see Levine 
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et al. 2000 for a review). However, several studies investigate the manner in which 
receivers of a norm-violating communication or behavior react to the individual 
committing the norm violation.  
Brauer and Chekroun (2005) investigated whether an individual will express 
disapproval to a violator of social norms. In a series of field studies, they tested whether 
bystanders would comment on a confederate’s norm violating action. These violations 
included posting an advertisement over a bus schedule, cutting in line, littering, and 
drawing graffiti. They found that people were more likely to engage in expressions of 
social control if the norm violating behavior was more personally relevant (e.g., cutting in 
line and littering in an apartment complex entrance hall, vs. placing a poster over a bus 
schedule or littering in a park). Expressions of social control included expressing anger, 
disgust, or disapproval, with techniques ranging from facial expressions and audible sighs 
to direct comments. 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) confirm that there is inadequate research on 
responses to norm violations. They discuss research using experimental games to observe 
reactions to non-normative behavior, noting that those who punish non-normative 
behavior often do so by becoming less cooperative with the norm-violator. The 
psychology and communication literature also states that individuals will evaluate norm-
violating communicators more carefully, suggesting a more systematic process. Burgoon 
and her colleagues developed expectancy violation theory (EVT) to model reactions to 
departures from norms or otherwise expected behavior.6 One of the propositions of EVT 
                                                            
6 In the communications literature, debate exists on whether norm violations and expectancy violations 
represent separate constructs (see Levine et al. 2000). However, they are considered highly correlated and 
include similar predictions. Further, White (2008) notes that EVT includes both “predictive expectancies” 
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is that negative expectancy violations should lead to negative outcomes (Burgoon et al. 
1995). In the accounting literature, Clor-Proell (2009) investigated the effects of an 
expectancy violation on investors’ views of management’s credibility, as well as the 
effect on their investment decisions and information search efforts. Clor-Proell noted that 
expectation violations theory (EVT) predicts more systematic processing of an 
unexpected communication, due to a need to more closely evaluate the source of the 
expectancy violation. She expected that this would predict increased information search 
on the part of investors. This was found in her second experiment; in her first experiment, 
she found a marginal increase in the amount of time spent on the task, suggesting greater 
levels of effort in response to an expectancy violation. 
In general, though, this literature suggests the possibility that individuals may 
react less cooperatively to a norm violating request. Additionally, in the absence of 
additional cues (see the earlier section on communication mode), the wording in e-mail 
may be more salient (Suh 1999). Accordingly, it is possible that there may be a greater 
reaction to a norm violation in e-mail vs. other modes of communication.  
 
Client Agreement with Auditor Adjustments 
Prior research in auditing shows that auditors and clients often engage in 
negotiations over accounting issues, particularly issues that involve estimation 
uncertainty (e.g., Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2007). While the survey literature has 
looked often at both sides of the auditor-client negotiation process, most experimental 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
for behavior we expect to occur and “prescriptive expectancies” for behavior we prefer to occur. The latter 
can be said to include expectations regarding behavioral norms.  
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research has focused on the auditor side of negotiations (Salterio 2012). However, several 
studies have looked at client reactions to different audit strategies. 
After Gibbins, Salterio and their colleagues provided initial survey data on 
auditor-client negotiations, Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) provided data on both client 
and auditor initial positions and strategies on opposite sides of the same negotiation. 
Amongst their findings, they noted that clients have more flexibility in their negotiation 
stances and could also be more aggressive in their opening positions. In addition, auditors 
underestimated the range of adjustments that the clients were willing to accept. In 
contrast, the clients were much more accurate in predicting the auditors’ acceptable 
ranges of outcomes, likely because 85% of the clients had audit experience.  
Most experimental studies have manipulated a fictional negotiation counterpart in 
order to test a specific causual proposition.7 Sanchez et al. (2007) investigated whether 
clients would react favorably to an auditor’s reciprocity-based strategy. If an auditor 
waived small immaterial adjustments and revealed this fact to the client, the client was 
more likely to concede a material adjustment in a negotiation with the auditor than if the 
waived adjustments were not revealed. Sanchez et al. posited that this was because the 
clients were engaging in the norm of reciprocity, in which they felt obligated to provide 
something to the auditors since the auditors had provided a concession to the client, 
regardless of the fact that the initial concession was immaterial.  
Tan and Trotman (2010) investigated the effects on the client of the auditor’s 
timing of concessions. They had four conditions manipulating the timing of the auditor’s 
                                                            
7 Wang and Tuttle (2009) used an experimental economics setting to test an interactive negotiation setting 
between “clients” and “auditors.” In this study, they investigated the effect of mandatory auditor rotation 
regimes on auditor-client negotiation strategies.  
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concessions: either entirely in the first round (of four rounds), entirely in the second 
round, entirely in the final round, or gradually over each of the four rounds. Clients 
agreed to larger income decreasing adjustments when the auditor concessions were 
offered gradually over the four rounds or completely in the final round, and they were 
also more satisfied with the negotiation outcome and were more likely to want to 
continue the relationship with the auditor. Together, these results suggest that auditors 
should not concede quickly.  
Perreault and Kida (2011) investigated four persuasion tactics and two 
communication styles. The persuasion tactics were threaten to qualify the opinion, 
threaten with a quality review, refer to the opinion of the technical office, or note that 
other companies use the same method (social reference). Social reference was the most 
persuasive tactic, along with threatening to qualify. However, threatening to qualify 
reduced positive affect towards the auditor, as well as client intention to continue with the 
auditor. Therefore, it appears that social reference was most effective. Further, they 
investigated a cooperative vs. contentious approach. The cooperative approach was both 
more effective and engendered more positive affect. 
Finally, Perreault, Kida, and Piercey (2013) look at whether clients will concede 
more if issues are negotiated either simultaneously or sequentially. They find that 
negotiating multiple issues simultaneously leads to greater client concessions, as does 
presenting larger issues first.  
While these studies primarily look at the effects of various auditor negotiation 
strategies on client concessions in an auditor-client negotiation setting, none of these 
consider the effects of earlier client behavior on their later negotiation behavior. In the 
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current study, I specifically investigate whether clients are more or less likely to accept 
an auditor’s income-reducing proposed adjustment if the client had previously revealed 
an information set that is more biased towards items that support the client’s position.  
 
Fluency Effects 
Psychological research into fluency effects suggests that a client would be more 
willing to accept an argument if they had previously revealed the information themselves. 
Garcia-Marques and Mackie (2001) conducted an experiment to demonstrate that 
arguments are more persuasive after repeat exposure. In their experiment, 120 
undergraduate students were either exposed to 0, 1, 2, or 4 repetitions of information. 
Additionally, Garcia-Marques and Mackie manipulated whether the argument was strong 
or weak. They found that more repetitions resulted in no difference in the acceptance of 
strong or weak arguments, whereas no repetition led participants to differentiate between 
strong and weak arguments. This implies that individuals are more likely to accept an 
argument without criticism based on multiple exposures to the same information. 
Interestingly, it only took 1 repetition of the information to cause no difference between 
weak and strong arguments (1, 2, and 4 did not differ).  
In a follow-up study, Claypool et al. (2004) looked at whether personal relevance 
had an effect on acceptance of arguments based on repeat exposure. They found that 
repeated exposure for issues with higher personal relevance led to greater acceptance of 
strong arguments vs. no repetition, as well as greater differentiation between strong and 
weak arguments.  
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In the current study, I am positing that having personally revealed information 
essentially increases exposure to the items the participants choose to reveal (otherwise, 
all exposure to the items is constant). In the context of my study, the repetition is self-
generated (i.e., the participants themselves cause the repetition by writing down certain 
items). Following the results of the aforementioned studies, it would be expected that if 
the participants personally reveal an information set that is more biased towards items 
that support their position (therefore, revealing a set of information that suggests less of 
an obsolescence problem), they are exposed less to the disconfirming items and will 
likely be less accepting of arguments in support of an income-decreasing adjustment. 
 
Summary 
Audit inquiry is an important and often used methodology for gathering 
information and investigating unusual or unexpected fluctuations (Trompeter and Wright 
2010). The literature on communication mode and professional tone suggests that there 
could be differences in responses to requests via e-mail vs. F2F or phone, as well as a less 
professional vs. a more professional communication. Further, the literature on fluency 
effects suggests that there could be a difference in client acceptance of an auditor’s 
proposed adjustment if the client provides a more biased response to the original request.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To investigate the effects of communication mode and professional tone on client 
responses to audit inquiries, I conducted an experiment to test the responses of clients to 
an audit inquiry sent either via an e-mail, a video, or an audio recording. I also 
manipulated whether the wording of the communication was more or less professional. 
After they responded, I then asked clients the extent of their agreement with an 
adjustment proposed by the auditor. Finally, I asked various post-experimental questions 
to measure certain attitudes of the participants.  
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Based on the literature on communication mode discussed in the prior chapter, it 
would appear that in response to an e-mail request from an auditor as compared to a 
visual or audio request, a client is more likely to engage in defensive bolstering or to be 
less cooperative as a result of reduced social presence. Defensive bolstering is a 
systematic process that requires greater cognitive resources. The presence of additional 
cues in visual and audio communications (e.g., vocal inflection, non-verbal gestures, and 
appearance) can cause cognitive depletion, reducing an individual’s ability to bolster their 
position. Therefore, a client may be better able to engage in defensive bolstering in 
response to an e-mail request. Further, because audio and visual requests involve greater 
social presence than an e-mail request, clients are more likely to be cooperative and 
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provide a less biased set of information to the auditor in response to an audio or visual 
request. Accordingly, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Participants will provide an information set that is more biased towards items 
that support their position vs. items that do not support their position in response 
to an e-mail inquiry as compared to an audio or visual inquiry.  
 
It is unclear whether there will be a difference between responses to audio and 
visual requests. Social presence theory would suggest that an individual would be more 
cooperative in response to a F2F request than a phone request (Short 1974), although 
Daft and Lengel (1986) suggest that there may not be a difference for a relatively simple 
request. Due to the uncertainty whether the task in this study may be considered simple or 
not, I make no prediction whether responses to audio or visual inquiries will differ.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
As noted in the literature review, a less professional tone could lead to an aversive 
reaction to a perceived norm violation. This reaction could be in the form of reduced 
cooperativeness with the auditor. Accordingly, I would expect that a less professional 
request should lead to a response that is more biased towards items that support the 
client’s position, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Participants will provide an information set that is more biased towards items 
that support their position vs. items that do not support their position in response 
to an inquiry with a less professional tone as compared to a more professional 
tone. 
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Also, it is possible that the professional tone is more salient in an e-mail, due to 
the absence of additional cues. If that is the case, this would suggest that reaction to the 
norm violation would be exacerbated in the e-mail condition and attenuated in the audio 
and visual conditions. While theory would suggest this tendency, the extent of the 
exacerbation and attenuation is unclear. I explore this possibility in the results section in 
the next chapter. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Finally, based on the literature on fluency effects discussed in the prior chapter, I 
predict that clients are less likely to agree with a proposed income decreasing adjustment 
if they previously provided a response that is more biased towards items that support their 
position. This leads to my final hypothesis: 
 
H3: If a client provides a response set that is more biased towards items that support 
the client’s position, the client is less likely to agree with an auditor’s subsequent 
proposed income-reducing adjustment.  
 
Participants 
Participants were 183 experienced business professionals enrolled in management 
training programs. They had an average of 11.6 years of business experience and 6.0 
years of managerial experience. The mean age of the participants was 37 and 32% were 
female. Results did not vary by gender and age is not a significant covariate.  
It is generally recommended that auditors inquire with both financial and non-
financial personnel within an organization (Messier et al. 2012). Participants’ 
professional roles included upper level executives (e.g., CFOs, controllers, and vice-
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presidents), operations managers, financial analysts, and sales managers.8 In the results 
section, I analyze whether results are affected by managerial experience, executive vs. 
non-executive role, and financial vs. non-financial personnel.  
 
Manipulations 
The experiment was administered online via Qualtrics. Participants engaged in a 
task in which an auditor requests information related to inventory obsolescence. There 
were two manipulated independent variables: communication mode (e-mail, audio, or 
visual) and professional tone of the communication (more professional vs. less 
professional), resulting in a 3x2 between-subjects design. The flow of the experiment can 
be seen in Figure 3.1.  
Participants were told either that the junior auditor “sent you an e-mail. Please 
click the button to read,” “calls you on the phone, please click the button to listen,” or 
“comes to see you in person. Please click the button to see.” Dependent on condition, 
participants read an e-mail, listened to an audio track, or saw a video. The visual 
condition showed a video of the same auditor from the introduction video. He makes the 
same request as the e-mail condition, using the same wording. The audio condition was 
the audio track from the video.  
The additional manipulation was whether the wording was more or less 
professional. The wording of the less professional tone was developed based on a 
                                                            
8 16% of the participants were upper level executives, 63% were management level, and 21% were 
experienced business professionals without management experience.  
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Figure 3.1 - Experimental Flow 
STAGE 1: INQUIRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAGE 2: PROPOSED AUDIT ADJUSTMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
a Net items revealed = The number of items revealed by the client that support a write-down for inventory obsolescence less the number of items revealed that do 
not support a write-down for inventory obsolescence. Lower values represent a client response that is more biased towards items that support the client’s position 
of no inventory obsolescence.  
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preliminary study in which senior auditing students were provided with the front end of 
the experimental instrument and were asked to compose an inquiry to the client regarding 
inventory obsolescence. Examples from students who had one to five months of audit 
experience, most with Big 4 firms, were considered. The wording of the less professional 
condition was also provided to several corporate managers and an audit partner, who each 
provided feedback on the realism as well as their experience with e-mails from 
inexperienced professionals. Some changes were made based on this feedback.  
The specific wording of each professional tone condition can be seen in Table 3.1. 
In order to prevent potential confounds between the spoken and written conditions, the e-
mail does not include grammar errors or misspellings, even though this is a common 
problem in e-communication (cf. Carr and Stefaniak 2012).9 
 
Experimental Design 
The experimental scenario was adapted from Fanning and Piercey (2013), with 
financial information adapted from Cohen et al. (2005). Participants assumed the role of a 
client manager responsible for interfacing with the auditor concerning inventory 
questions. The background material stated that “like most companies, it is the goal of 
management to present income as high as possible. However, the company does not want 
to receive a qualified audit opinion, which would indicate that the auditor believes the 
                                                            
9 In my preliminary study of senior auditing students, these problems were common, even among students 
with experience in Big 4 and other large accounting firms.  
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Table 3.1 - Wording of Professional Tone Manipulation 
 
More professional wording: 
“As previously discussed, I am working on the audit of inventory and I have several 
questions for you.  
 
We have concerns about a potential inventory obsolescence issue related to your product. 
If there were an obsolescence problem, it could indicate the need for a write-down of the 
inventory value to the proper market value which, of course, would reduce your net 
income.  
 
To aid in our analysis, could you please provide me with information regarding any new 
products from other companies that are superior to your product? Please describe how 
this could affect sales of your product and whether you would have to sell your product at 
a loss.  
 
If you believe there are factors that mitigate a potential obsolescence problem, please let 
me know.  
 
Thank you, I appreciate your time.” 
 
Less professional wording: 
“As I said before, I’m doing the inventory audit and I’ve got some questions.  
 
We think there might be a problem with the inventory numbers. I mean there may be an 
inventory obsolescence problem. And if that happens we might need to write down the 
numbers for inventory to be at the real market value which is going to reduce your net 
income.  
 
So we can look at this and figure out if there’s a problem, let me know are there any new 
products from other companies which are better than your product? We are wondering 
what could this do to your product sales and could it make it that you’d have to sell your 
product at a loss. 
 
If you think there are things that make you believe there’s not really an obsolescence 
problem, let me know. 
 
Thanks.” 
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financial statements are materially misstated.”10  
Participants were first introduced to the junior staff auditor. In a video, the auditor 
introduces himself as “Ryan Miller” and says that he is working on the audit of inventory. 
The purpose of this introductory video was to hold constant exposure to the auditor’s 
image and voice, ruling out that any effects found arise from the fact that participants 
inthe e-mail condition have not seen or heard the auditor, and participants in the audio 
condition have not seen the auditor.  
The participants were then given an opportunity to review information about the 
company and the company’s products. They were also informed that they would be 
allowed to refer back to the materials if needed. The information included company 
background, selected financial information including inventory performance measures, 
and eighteen specific information items about the company’s products and related 
obsolescence risks. Half of these items supported a write-down of inventory obsolescence 
and, therefore, did not support the client’s position that no write-down is necessary, while 
half of the items did not support a write-down of inventory, supporting the client’s 
position of no inventory obsolescence. Examples of items that supported an inventory 
obsolescence write-down include: “One of the division’s VPs discovered at a trade show 
that the competition has designed a technologically superior product that has the potential 
to make ManuTech’s component technologically obsolete”; “Some customers have 
already pre-ordered the new device from the competition”; and “The price point at which 
                                                            
10 This statement, adapted from Perreault et al. (2013), was designed to provide the client position to the 
participants and to induce enough of an incentive so that participants would not simply agree with 
everything the auditor proposed. It is interesting to note that 42% of the participants engaged in persuasion 
attempts, i.e., rather than just provide information, they actively attempted to convince the auditor there 
was no obsolescence issue. This was despite having no incentive to do so, other than this statement. Only 
6% indicated in their response that they thought the inventory was obsolete (the remaining 52% did not 
provide an opinion in their response).  
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ManuTech’s component could be sold in international markets would probably not be 
enough to cover the product costs for the component.” Items that did not support an 
inventory obsolescence write-down include: “It is an open question as to whether or not 
the competition will be successful at taking away ManuTech’s market share as the 
Company’s products have an established reputation in the market”; “It might be possible 
that ManuTech’s existing component could continue to serve existing customers’ needs 
until the commercial success and cost competitiveness of the competitor’s new 
technology is established”; and “Some sources suggest that the competition may not have 
done adequate testing of their new product.” A full list of the items included can be seen 
in Table 3.2. 
The participants then received an inquiry regarding inventory obsolescence. In the 
inquiry, the auditor notes concerns about an inventory obsolescence problem and asks 
about the effects of potential competing products and whether there are mitigating factors 
that would reduce obsolescence risk. The inquiry is where I implemented a between-
subjects manipulation of communication mode and professional tone.   
With e-mail inquiry, individuals have the ability to re-read the text. To control for 
this between conditions, participants had the option to replay the audio and visual 
requests. This was possible even while composing their response. This is akin to asking 
someone to repeat their request and is consistent with the ability to re-read the e-mail. 
The participants were then instructed, “In the space below, please compose your 
response to the auditor.” Participants were able to refer back to the company background, 
financial information, and inventory-related issues. Their response was automatically 
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Table 3.2 – Inventory Related Items in Experimenta 
 
Supports client’s position of no inventory obsolescence 
 The current year inventory for this component compared to last year’s and two 
years’ ago audited figures suggests that the account has not fluctuated very much.  
 It is an open question as to whether or not the competition will be successful at 
taking away ManuTech’s market share as the Company’s products have an 
established reputation in the market.  
 The Inventory Turnover ratio for this year is similar to what it was last year and 
two years ago, and it’s also similar to the industry average. 
 Initial market research suggests there may be a viable third-world international 
market for ManuTech’s component.  
 The Days Inventory ratio for this year is similar to what it was last year and two 
years ago, and it’s also similar to the industry average. 
 ManuTech has an international marketing team that aggressively markets older 
technology products in developing nations around the world through existing 
marketing and distribution channels. 
 Some sources suggest that the competition may not have done adequate testing of 
their new product. 
 ManuTech may be able to repurpose a portion of the technology in the component 
to sell in other products. 
 It might be possible that ManuTech’s existing component could continue to serve 
existing customers’ needs until the commercial success and cost competitiveness 
of the competitor’s new technology is established. 
Does not support client’s position of no inventory obsolescence (supports a write-down of 
inventory) 
 One of the division’s VPs discovered at a trade show that the competition has 
designed a technologically superior product that has the potential to make 
ManuTech’s component technologically obsolete. 
 The competition is expected to have their product ready for the market very soon. 
 Some customers have already pre-ordered the new device from the competition. 
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 The competition’s new component will sell at approximately the same price point 
that ManuTech’s component is currently selling. 
 The competitor has started taking pre-orders of their component in an attempt to 
gain market share. 
 Significant pricing changes for Manutech’s component may be necessary, in 
which case profitability will be uncertain. 
 The price point at which ManuTech’s component could be sold in international 
markets would probably not be enough to cover the product costs for the 
component. 
 The size of the international market is debatable, so it may take up to four years to 
sell off the entire inventory of ManuTech’s component in those markets, and 
whether conditions will remain stable in those markets for the duration of the four 
years is uncertain. 
 Repurposing a portion of ManuTech’s existing technology for use in other items 
would require an up-front investment in retooling the production process. Since 
profitability is uncertain, the Board of Directors may be resistant to an additional 
investment in the existing technology. 
 
a See research instrument in the Appendix for order presented. 
 
 
saved as they worked to prevent loss of text while going back to see and/or hear the 
request again. 
After submitting their response, the participants learned that the audit partner 
contacted the management team to propose an $18 million adjustment for inventory 
obsolescence, or 6% of the inventory balance (17% of net income).11 The narrative states 
that the proposed adjustment was based on facts provided by the participant, by other 
                                                            
11 Various professionals who pilot-tested or reviewed the instrument, including experienced auditors and 
corporate managers, provided feedback that this adjustment was perceived as material. 
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managers, and as a result of other audit procedures. The narrative also included the 
auditors’ description of factors that led to the adjustment. The purpose of this was to 
ensure that the participants were aware of the reasons for the adjustment, regardless of 
whether they revealed the information themselves.  
Participants were then asked to provide the degree to which they agreed with the 
proposed adjustment on a ten point scale anchored from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. They were then told that the management team wanted their input on how to 
respond. Specifically, they were asked whether the company should accept the 
adjustment outright and, if not, how much the company should counter-propose and the 
maximum write-down the company should be willing to accept.  
Finally, the participants were asked various post-experimental questions regarding 
their opinions of the auditor and audit team. I also asked several questions regarding 
views on professional technology use and professionalism and then collected 
demographic data. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Net Items Revealed 
 The primary dependent variable was the number of items revealed that support a 
write-down of inventory minus the number of items revealed that do not support a write-
down of inventory, referred to as “net items revealed.” A lower value of net items 
revealed represents a response that is more biased towards items that support the client’s 
position of no inventory obsolescence.  
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Responses were coded by two independent coders and by the author, all blind to 
experimental condition. The coders had between three and thirteen years of audit 
experience. The responses were provided to each coder in a different random order. For 
each response, the coders identified which of the 18 items in the inventory-related issues 
list were revealed by the participant.12 If the participant revealed at least part of a 
particular item, even if inaccurately, it was considered revealed to the auditor under the 
logic that the auditor could ask follow-up clarifying questions or search for corroborating 
evidence. Inter-rater reliability (IRR) was measured using Krippendorff’s alpha (Hayes 
and Krippendorff 2007), which is designed to measure IRR for interval data.13 IRR for 
net items revealed was .808, which indicates a high level of reliability (Neuendorf 2002). 
All remaining coding differences were resolved between the three coders without dispute. 
   
Measures of Agreement with Proposed Audit Adjustment 
As noted earlier, the participants were informed that the auditor had proposed a 
material income-decreasing adjustment and the participants were asked questions 
regarding their level of agreement. The first question asked, “On the following scale, 
                                                            
12 Few participants revealed anything outside of the eighteen inventory-related issues, even though they had 
other information about the company background and the company’s overall financial performance. 
Accordingly, coders only recorded whether each of the eighteen inventory-related items were revealed.  
 
13 Net items revealed represents a net count of specific items revealed (interval coding) rather than a 
categorization of items (nominal coding). The coders did not make a judgment regarding whether the items 
revealed supported or did not support a write-down. The valence was pre-determined and the coders only 
identified if an item was revealed, resulting in a count of specific items revealed. Cohen’s kappa, which is 
commonly used for IRR, is only appropriate for nominal coding (i.e., categorization) and cannot be used 
for more than two coders at a time. Under Cohen’s kappa, if one coder concludes that three supporting 
items were revealed and another concludes that four were revealed, this would be a complete miss, 
equivalent to one coder finding three items and one finding zero. Krippendorff’s alpha appropriately 
weights responses that are closer to each other. Accordingly, Krippendorff’s alpha is a more precise 
measure when the outcome is a count of items (interval coding) rather than a categorization of responses 
(nominal coding). See Neuendorf 2002. 
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please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the auditor’s proposal of this 
inventory write-down.” The scale was a 10-point scale anchored with “Strongly disagree” 
and “Strongly agree.” They were then asked, “Should ManuTech accept the auditors’ 
proposed inventory write-down?” with a possible response of yes or no. The first 
question represented strength of agreement whereas the second question represented a 
dichotomous measure of whether or not the participant accepted the adjustment outright.  
If they responded that ManuTech should not accept the adjustment outright, they 
were then asked two questions to measure their opening negotiation positions. The first 
asked what amount the participant thought ManuTech should counterpropose and the 
second asked what should be the maximum acceptable adjustment. In both cases, a 
sliding scale was provided that allowed the participant to answer in millions between $0 
and $18 million.  
 
Post-Experimental Questions 
After completing the auditor’s adjustment section, participants were then asked 
several attitude and demographic questions. The purpose of the attitude measures was 
primarily to determine if there were alternative explanations for the primary results. The 
first section of questions measured certain affective response to Ryan Miller (the junior 
auditor) and to the auditors overall. On zero to ten scales anchored with “Not at all” and 
“Very much,” participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the junior auditor or 
the audit team made them feel angry, annoyed, sad, happy, and frustrated. They were 
then asked their agreement with several statements to measure whether they found Ryan 
likable, intelligent, competent and credible; whether they found the auditors competent 
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and credible; how important it was for them to respond well to Ryan; how obligated they 
felt to respond to Ryan thoroughly; whether Ryan’s questions affected their opinion about 
the inventory obsolescence write-down; whether Ryan was disrespectful; and whether 
they would want to work with Ryan or the audit firm again. Finally, they were asked if 
they felt that the proposed adjustment was unfair.  
They were then asked “How professional did you think Ryan was in his request 
for information?” This question, which was on a 9-point scale anchored with “Very 
unprofessional” and “Very professional,” was to measure the salience of the professional 
tone manipulation. The participants were also asked how old they think Ryan was.  
In the next section, the participants were asked several questions related to their 
technology usage, including how often they use text messaging or instant messaging for 
personal and professional communication, as well as how often they use certain social 
networking sites.14 They were then asked to allocate the percent of time that they use 
certain communication methods for professional use and what percent of the time they 
would prefer to receive a request for information via different communication methods.  
Next, they were asked if they agreed with the statement, “It is important to be 
professional in your interactions with colleagues and customers/clients.” They were also 
asked their level of agreement with a statement “compared to other professionals my age, 
I am generally on the cutting edge of technology.” Finally, they were asked four 
questions to measure their views on power distance, adapted from House et al. (2004). 
Greater levels of power distance indicate that an individual believes there should be 
greater deference to individuals who are higher in an organization. These measures were 
                                                            
14 Although substantially modified, this was developed based on a technology usage scale from Scott and 
Timmerman (2005).  
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included in the post-experimental questions to explore whether power distance may be a 
potential covariate.  
The final section of the instrument asked demographic questions, including years 
of business and managerial experience, professional title, industry, gender, and age.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 In this chapter, I first detail the results of the participant responses to the auditor 
inquiry, including the tests of H1 and H2. I then explore the salience of the professional 
tone manipulation and describe additional analyses and a supplemental study designed to 
further explore the theory that the effects of a less professional communication are related 
to a perceived norm violation. Following this, I discuss the responses to the measures of 
agreement with the auditor’s proposed adjustment, testing H3. Finally, I explore the 
results of the post-experimental questions.  
 
Analysis of Client Responses to Auditor Request 
  As previously noted, the primary dependent variable was measured based on the 
difference of the number of items revealed that support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence less the number of items revealed that do not support a write-down, referred 
to as “net items revealed.” A lower value of net items revealed represents a greater extent 
of bias towards items that support the client’s position of no inventory write-down. 
Descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 4.1, Panel A. The means are presented 
graphically in Figure 4.1. Panel B of Table 4.1 details ANOVA results indicating a 
significant main effect for communication mode (F=4.35, p=.014). Planned contrasts of 
e-mail vs. audio and visual, presented in Panel C, show that participants who received an 
e-mail inquiry provided responses that were more biased towards items that support the  
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Table 4.1 – Net Items Revealed by Client in Response to Auditor Inquiry 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics - Meana (standard deviation)b [n] 
 Request Tone:   More Professional 
 Less 
Professional  Average  
 Request Mode:  
 -0.07   -0.78   -0.45  
 E-Mail   (2.14)   (1.96)   (2.06)  
 [28]   [32]   [60]  
 0.63   0.38   0.52  
 Audio   (1.56)   (1.82)   (1.67)  
 [35]   [29]   [64]  
 0.33   -0.03   0.14  
 Visual   (1.75)   (1.28)   (1.51)  
 [27]   [32]   [59]  
 0.32   -0.16   0.08  
 Total   (1.82)   (1.76)   (1.80)  
 [90]   [93]   [183]  
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
df Mean Square F-statistic p-valuec 
Main Effects 
Communication Mode 2 13.504 4.351 0.014 
Professional Tone 1 8.835 2.847 0.047 
Two-way Interaction 
Mode x Tone 2 0.874 0.282 0.755 
Error 177 3.103 
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts
t-statistic p-valued
Contrast of e-mail vs. audio and visual: 
E-mail vs. audio 2.929 0.002 
E-mail vs. visual 1.782 0.038 
Contrast of audio and visual (2-tailed) 1.106 0.270 
Contrast of professional tone within each level of 
communication mode: 
E-mail 1.709 0.045 
Audio 0.743 0.229 
Visual 0.769 0.221 
a Net items revealed = The number of items revealed by the client that support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence less the number of items revealed that do not support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence. Lower values represent a client response that is more biased towards items that support the 
client’s position of no inventory obsolescence.
b Levene's test of equality of variance indicates no difference in variances (p=.092). 
c For the F-test with one degree of freedom, the p-value presented is the 1-tailed equivalent p-value for a 
directional hypothesis. An F statistic with one degree of freedom is equivalent to the squared ANOVA 
contrast t-statistic and results in the identical p-value. For prior uses of this presentation, see Kachelmeier 
and Williamson (2010), Piercey (2011), and Elliott et al. (2012).  
d Unless otherwise noted, p-values are 1-tailed based on directional hypotheses. 
 
client’s position than those who received an audio inquiry (t=2.93, p=.002, 1-tailed) or a 
visual inquiry (t=1.78, p=.038, 1-tailed), supporting H1. The audio and visual conditions 
did not differ in terms of response bias (t=1.11, p=.270, 2-tailed).    
At first glance, the differences in net items revealed may not seem large. 
However, the grand mean of total items revealed was 4.23 items (2.08 items that support 
the client’s position and 2.15 items that do not support the client’s position). Therefore, 
the various differences represent as much as 33% of the mean total items revealed.  
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Figure 4.1 – Net Items Revealed by Client in Response to Auditor Inquiry 
 
 
________________________________ 
Net items revealed = The number of items revealed by the client that support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence less the number of items revealed that do not support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence. Lower values represent a client response that is more biased towards items that support the 
client’s position of no inventory obsolescence. 
 
Audio, Visual, and E-mail refer to the communication mode of the auditor’s inquiry for information related 
to inventory obsolescence. 
 
More professional and less professional refer to the professional tone of the auditor’s inquiry for 
information related to inventory obsolescence. The wording of each of these conditions can be seen in 
Table 3.1. 
 
Calculation of ߱ଶ for the main effect of communication mode suggests an effect size of 
.035, which is between a small (.01) and medium (.06) effect size (Field 2013). 
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The ANOVA also reveals a significant main effect for professional tone, 
supporting H2. In response to a less professional tone, participants provided an 
information set that was more biased towards items that support their position of no 
inventory obsolescence (F=2.85, p=.047, 1-tailed). The pattern of results presented in 
Table 4.1, and presented graphically in Figure 4.1, suggests that the effects of 
professional tone may be more pronounced in the e-mail condition. As previously 
discussed, since the norm violation may be more salient in the e-mail condition in the 
absence of nonverbal cues and vocal inflection, the effects of the norm violation could be 
exacerbated in the e-mail condition and attenuated in the audio and visual conditions. 
Planned contrasts of professional tone within each level of mode suggest that the 
difference between responses to inquiries in a more or less professional tone is significant 
in the e-mail condition (t=1.71, p=.045, 1-tailed15), but not in the audio (t=0.74, p=.229, 
1-tailed) or visual (t=0.77, p=.221, 1-tailed) conditions.16, 17  
                                                            
15 While the extent of exacerbation and attenuation was unclear on an a priori basis, the directional 
prediction for the main effect of professional tone remains consistent across cells, allowing for a one-tailed 
test.  
 
16 The interaction term in the ANOVA is not significant (F=0.28, p=.755). However, Buckless and 
Ravenscroft (1990) demonstrate that ANOVA is often inadequate for testing an ordinal interaction, 
primarily because ANOVA attributes most of the sums of squares in an ordinal interaction to the main 
effects. The interaction term in the standard ANOVA forces orthogonality by assigning contrast weights for 
a disordinal interaction, which is clearly not in evidence or otherwise predicted. This measurement problem 
is exacerbated when a factor has more than two levels, as is the case with communication mode (Buckless 
and Ravenscroft 1990). Accordingly, I conducted a contrast-coded test based on weights for a main effect 
of communication mode, a main effect of professional tone, and an ordinal interaction of mode and tone in 
which the effects of professional tone are exacerbated in the e-mail condition. The weights for each cell 
were 1, -9, 3, 1, 3, 1, where the first two weights are for the more professional and less professional e-mail, 
then the same respectively for audio and visual. The contrast coded omnibus F-test is significant (F=10.39, 
p=.002). This methodology also allows for a test to ensure that the contrast weighting represents a good fit 
by examining the remaining between-group sums of squares. This test of the residual explained sums of 
squares is not significant (F=0.43, p=.787), suggesting that the pattern of a main effect of communication 
mode, a main effect of professional tone, and an ordinal interaction of mode and tone is a good fit.  
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Salience of Professional Tone Manipulation 
To provide further support for the theory that the more biased response to the less 
professional condition was a result of a norm violation, I analyzed participants’ 
assessments of the professionalism of the request. In the post-experimental questions, 
participants were asked, “How professional did you think Ryan was in his request for 
information?” Participants responded using a 9 point scale anchored with 1=Very 
unprofessional and 9=Very professional. Based on the argument that differences in 
professional tone are less salient in the audio and visual conditions, leading to less 
reaction to a norm violation, I expected that there would be less difference in perceptions 
of professionalism in the audio or visual conditions, whereas perceptions of 
professionalism should differ in the e-mail condition. Further, the lack of statistical 
differences in response bias between more and less professional tone in the audio and 
visual conditions would suggest that assessments of professionalism in these conditions 
should not differ. Figure 4.2 shows the pattern of means for assessments of 
professionalism in the primary study. The main effect for professional tone (untabulated) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
17 I also analyzed effects of whether the participants were in a financial vs. a non-financial role and an 
executive vs. non-executive role. Approximately 14% were in a financial role and approximately 16% were 
in an executive role. As a result, analyzing results in an ANOVA with financial vs. non-financial or 
executive vs. non-executive runs the risk of finding spurious results for the financial or the executive 
participants since there are so few of each in a cell. However, ANOVAs of just the non-financial 
participants or just the non-executive participants result in qualitatively similar results for mode and tone as 
the full sample, although the effect of tone becomes marginal. This is likely a result of a loss of power. 
Overall, these analyses suggest that the results are not driven by either the participants in a financial role or 
the participants who are not executives. Further, I conducted a similar analysis excluding participants who 
had no managerial experience (21% of the sample). Results appear comparable, although the potential 
ordinal interaction is no longer evident; this is likely again a power issue. There is no a priori reason to 
suggest that the hypotheses would be different for non-managerial, financial, or executive participants and 
it would be difficult to obtain more of these particular types of participants. Libby et al. (2002) and Peecher 
and Solomon (2001) suggest that experiments should not use higher level or more specialized participants 
if there is no a priori reason to expect that these participants will behave differently.  
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Figure 4.2 – Client Perceptions of the Professionalism of the Auditor’s Inquiry 
 
 
______________________________ 
Response to question: “How professional did you think Ryan was in his request for information?” 1=Very 
unprofessional to 9=Very professional. A lower score means that the participant viewed Ryan’s request as 
less professional. 
 
Audio, Visual, and E-mail refer to the communication mode of the auditor’s inquiry for information related 
to inventory obsolescence. 
 
More professional and less professional refer to the professional tone of the auditor’s inquiry for 
information related to inventory obsolescence. The wording of each of these conditions can be seen in 
Table 3.1. 
 
 
was significant (F=2.07, p=.039, 1-tailed), indicating that participants in the less 
professional tone condition viewed the auditor as less professional compared to those in 
the more professional tone condition. The conventional ANOVA interaction term for 
mode x tone was not significant (F=2.22, p=.111), but the results in Figure 4.2 are highly 
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suggestive of an ordinal interaction. Again following Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990), 
the contrast coded interaction (untabulated) is significant (F=10.03, p=.002) and the 
residual is non-significant (F=0.42, p=.793), indicating that the model is a good fit.18   
Simple effects of tone within each level of communication mode indicate that 
only e-mail had a significant difference in perceptions of professionalism, with those in 
the e-mail/less professional condition judging the auditor’s request to be less professional 
than those in the e-mail/more professional condition (t=2.82, p=.003, 1-tailed). 
Assessments of professionalism did not differ within the audio (t=0.48, p=.634, 2-tailed) 
or visual (t=0.03, p=.978, 2-tailed) conditions. The mean perceptions of professionalism 
for audio and visual did not significantly differ from each other (t=1.30, p=.194, 2-tailed).  
Following recommendations in Hayes (2013), I tested whether there was evidence 
of moderated mediation via bootstrapping. Specifically, I investigated whether the effects 
of communication mode and professional tone on net items revealed are mediated by 
perceptions of professionalism. A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval 
developed from 10,000 bootstrap samples revealed significant indirect effects of the 
interaction of mode and tone on net items revealed, mediated through perceptions of 
professionalism in the predicted direction (the range of 0.001 to 0.525 does not include 
zero).19 Analyzing each level of communication mode and professional tone reveals that 
the indirect effect only occurred for differences in professional tone in the e-mail 
                                                            
18 In this case, there is no reason to expect a main effect of communication mode as there is no a priori 
reason to expect that use of e-mail in and of itself is considered less professional. Therefore, weightings of 
1, -5, 1, 1, 1, 1 are used where e-mail/less professional is the only cell expected to differ. 
 
19 For ease of interpretation and analysis, I collapsed the audio and visual conditions as there was no 
significant difference between the two conditions (p=.270, see Table 4.1, Panel C). As a result, all 
outcomes reported for bootstrapping are based on a 2x2 between-subjects design, in which mode is varied 
at e-mail vs. audio/visual and tone is more professional vs. less professional. 
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condition (indirect effect 95% confidence interval ranges from -0.507 to -0.014) and 
mode only led to indirect effects on net items revealed when tone was less professional 
(95% confidence interval from 0.008 to 0.449). This indicates that differences in net 
items revealed were mediated by views of professionalism in e-mail, suggesting that the 
differences in professionalism were only salient in the e-mail condition.20 
As further support, if differences in reactions to a less professional vs. a more 
professional tone were in fact a result of aversive reactions to norm violations, then 
participants with no business experience should have no difference in the bias level of 
their responses regardless of professional tone. To test this proposition, I collected 
additional data from 33 senior undergraduate business majors, as well as from 47 
additional experienced business professionals. I expected that undergraduates would 
likely be aware of the need for professionalism, but they lack the skill to perceive 
differences in professionalism and, accordingly, would not react negatively to the norm 
violation.21 
The study had a 2x2 between-subjects design (professional tone (more or less 
professional) x experienced/inexperienced). The experiment was identical to the main 
study except I only investigated the e-mail condition and there was no introduction video. 
The pattern of results can be seen in Figure 4.3. The interaction of professional tone and 
experience was significant (F=4.55, p=.036, untabulated). Planned contrasts within each 
                                                            
20 The direct effect of professional tone on net items revealed becomes non-significant when 
professionalism is included in the model, indicating a mediating effect of perceptions of professionalism. 
 
21 It could alternatively be argued that the inexperienced participants might not react to the norm violation 
because they do not view less professional wording as a problem (e.g., their experience with informal 
writing styles makes them more comfortable with professional norm departures). However, as can be seen 
in Figure 4.4, these participants failed to even notice a difference in professionalism of the auditor request, 
implying that the issue was a lack of perception rather than a disregard of an observed norm violation.  
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Figure 4.3 – Net Items Revealed by Clients in Response to Auditor Inquiry – Study 2 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Net items revealed = The number of items revealed by the client that support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence less the number of items revealed that do not support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence. Lower values represent a client response that is more biased towards items that support the 
client’s position of no inventory obsolescence. 
 
Inexperienced participants were 33 senior undergraduate business students. Experienced participants were 
47 experienced business professionals.  
 
More professional and less professional refer to the professional tone of the auditor’s inquiry for 
information related to inventory obsolescence. The wording of each of these conditions can be seen in 
Table 3.1. In this study, all participants responded to an e-mail inquiry. 
 
level of experience revealed that the inexperienced participants did not differ by 
professional tone (t=1.06, p=.293, 2-tailed). Consistent with the main study, the 
experienced participants differed by professional tone; those who received the less 
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professional request provided responses that were more biased towards items that support 
the client’s position of no inventory obsolescence as compared to those receiving a more 
professional request (t=2.27, p=.013, 1-tailed), replicating the main study (in this case, 
without any visual exposure to the auditor) and providing further support for H2.  
To support the argument that inexperienced participants failed to notice the 
difference in professionalism, I investigated the results of the post-experimental question 
about professionalism of the auditor’s request. The main effect for professional tone 
(untabulated) was significant (F=2.75, p=.051, 1-tailed). The ANOVA interaction term 
was not conventionally significant (F=2.08, p=.154) although, again, the results shown in 
Figure 4.4 are suggestive of an ordinal interaction. The contrast coded interaction 
(untabulated) was significant (F=7.95, p=.006).22 As can be seen in Figure 4.4, the 
inexperienced undergraduates had no difference in perceptions of professionalism, 
regardless of professional tone (t=0.04, p=.968, 2-tailed), while the experienced business 
professionals perceived a difference in professionalism, rating the less professional 
communication as significantly less professional than those in the more professional 
condition (t=2.44, p=.009, 1-tailed).  
  
Client Agreement with Proposed Adjustment 
To investigate whether there are downstream effects of failing to elicit 
information directly from a client, after supplying their response to the audit inquiry 
participants were told that the auditors proposed an adjustment for inventory 
obsolescence. They were then asked their level of agreement with the adjustment on a ten 
                                                            
22 As this was a 2x2 between-subjects design, the weights used were 1, 1, 1, -3. 
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Figure 4.4 – Client Perceptions of the Professionalism of the Auditor’s Inquiry – Study 2 
 
 
____________________________ 
Response to question: “How professional did you think Ryan was in his request for information?” 1=Very 
unprofessional to 9=Very professional. A lower score means that the participant viewed Ryan’s request as 
less professional. 
 
Inexperienced participants were 33 senior undergraduate business students. Experienced participants were 
47 experienced business professionals.  
 
More professional and less professional refer to the professional tone of the auditor’s inquiry for 
information related to inventory obsolescence. The wording of each of these conditions can be seen in 
Figure 3.1. In this study, all participants responded to an e-mail inquiry. 
 
 
point scale anchored with strongly disagree and strongly agree. They were also asked 
whether the company should accept the adjustment and, if not, the amount the company 
should counteroffer. Finally, they were asked the maximum adjustment the company 
should accept. 
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Table 4.2 details descriptive statistics for each of these four dependent variables 
and the results of regression analyses for each dependent variable with net items revealed 
as the independent variable. The regression coefficients indicate that if a client provides a 
set of information that is more biased towards items that support their position, they are 
less likely to agree with the auditor’s proposed adjustment (b=0.306, p<.001)23 and they 
are less likely to accept the auditor’s adjustment outright (b=0.246, p=.012).24 The effects 
of the influence of net items revealed on audit outcomes are further demonstrated by an 
analysis of the participants’ initial negotiation positions. As noted earlier, prior research 
has demonstrated that initial negotiation positions are often predictive of negotiation 
outcomes (Hatfield et al. 2010; Brown-Liburd and Wright 2011). Therefore, if clients 
initiate negotiations with a lower counteroffer and a lower maximum acceptable 
adjustment, this would predict a lower final adjustment, potentially affecting audit 
outcomes. The results indicate that clients who previously provided a response set that 
was more biased towards items that support their position provide a lower 
counterproposal (b=0.587, p=.002) and have a lower maximum acceptable adjustment 
(b=0.478, p=.020). Together, these results provide support for H3.  
Since communication mode and professional tone affect the extent of bias in the 
response, and the extent of bias in the response affects the client’s willingness to agree 
with an auditor’s proposed income-decreasing adjustment, it stands to reason that 
communication mode and professional tone may affect agreement with the auditor
                                                            
23 All p-values in this section are 1-tailed based on directional predictions. 
 
24 For a logistic regression, the coefficient can be transformed into an odds ratio. This coefficient implies 
that for each one unit increase in net items revealed (i.e., a less biased response), the client is 1.3 times 
more likely to accept the auditor’s proposed adjustment. 
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Table 4.2 – Client Agreement with Auditor’s Proposed Write-down 
 
Regression 
coefficients for 
independent 
variable: NET 
ITEMS 
REVEALED 
Dependent variable: Mean SD n b p-value 
AGREEMENT LEVEL 5.32 2.30 183 0.306 <0.001 
ACCEPT (Mean = % responding 
"Yes") 21.5% 0.41 181 0.246 0.012 
COUNTERPROPOSAL $6.35 million 4.26 142 0.587 0.002 
MAXIMUM $9.69 million 4.44 142 0.478 0.020 
All p-values are 1-tailed for directional predictions.          
Variable definitions: 
NET ITEMS REVEALED The number of items revealed by the client that support a 
write-down for inventory obsolescence less the number of 
items revealed that do not support a write-down for inventory 
obsolescence. Lower values represent a client response that is 
more biased towards items that support the client’s position of 
no inventory obsolescence. 
AGREEMENT LEVEL Client's level of agreement with the auditor's proposed income-
decreasing adjustment on a scale from 1=Strongly disagree to 
10=Strongly agree.  
ACCEPT Response to Yes/No question, "Should ManuTech accept the 
auditors’ proposed inventory write-down?" 0=No, 1=Yes. 
Regression results are from a logistic regression. 
COUNTERPROPOSAL Response to question: "If no [on ACCEPT], what amount 
should ManuTech counterpropose to the auditor for the 
inventory write-down?" Scale was provided ranging from $0 to 
$18 million, moving in $1 million intervals. 
MAXIMUM Response to question: "What is the maximum amount of 
inventory write-down you think ManuTech should be willing 
to accept?" Scale was provided ranging from $0 to $18 million, 
moving in $1 million intervals. 
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indirectly through the extent of bias in the net items revealed. Following procedures 
recommended by Hayes (2013) for testing indirect effects, I used a bias-corrected 
bootstrapping analysis based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and generated a 95% 
confidence interval for each test of indirect effects. The confidence intervals revealed 
either significant (the confidence interval does not contain zero) or marginally significant 
indirect effects of communication mode and professional tone on the various measures of 
agreement with the auditor through net items revealed. Communication mode indirectly 
affects agreement with the auditor’s proposed adjustment through net items revealed 
(95% confidence interval = 0.053 to 0.541).25 The indirect effect of professional tone on 
agreement with the auditor was marginally outside the 95% confidence interval (-0.381 to 
0.001).  
I conducted similar analyses for each of the other three dependent variables 
related to agreement with the auditor. In each case, the indirect effect of communication  
mode on the measure of agreement with the auditor was significant (zero did not appear 
in the 95% bootstrap confidence interval). The indirect effect of professional tone on 
acceptance of the auditor’s adjustment was marginally significant, but the indirect effects 
of professional tone on the counterproposal and the maximum acceptable adjustment 
were not conventionally significant. Overall, these results indicate that communication 
mode indirectly affected both the client’s propensity to agree with the auditor’s proposed 
income-reducing adjustment and the client’s opening negotiation positions through the 
                                                            
25 As in the earlier bootstrapping analyses, for ease of interpretation and analysis, I collapsed the audio and 
visual conditions as they did not significantly differ. 
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degree of bias in their response, while professional tone had only a marginal indirect 
effect on the client’s propensity to agree, but not on their opening negotiation positions.26  
 
Supplementary Analyses 
After completing the experiment, I asked several post-experimental questions. 
Table 4.3 details the means for each of the post-experimental questions. Except for those 
specifically noted in the text below, none of these varied by experimental condition. In 
Panel A, I present the mean responses to the various affect measures. In general, the 
experiment did not elicit a strong affective response. The affect measures were included 
primarily because prior research had suggested that affect can be a factor in responses to 
different types of communication (e.g., Cheshin et al. 2011; Byron 2008). Participants 
were asked to what extent Ryan Miller (the junior auditor) or the overall audit team 
separately caused the participants to feel certain types of affect, including anger, sadness, 
frustration, happiness, and annoyance. The mean responses to affective measures were 
typically at the lower end of the scale, ranging from 0.66 to 3.57 (on a 0 to 10 point scale 
anchored with “Not at all” and “Very much”). In the case of sadness and happiness 
towards Ryan and the auditors, the median was zero, meaning over half the participants 
felt none of those feelings. The median for anger towards the auditors was 1.00 and the 
highest median was 3.00 for annoyance and frustration at the auditors.27 
                                                            
26 The direct effects of mode and tone on the various measures of agreement with the auditor were not 
significant, nor were they expected to be, due to the length of the experimental task and due to the fact that 
communication mode and professional tone were not manipulated with respect to the proposed adjustment. 
Per Hayes (2013), evidence of a direct effect is not necessary to determine that a significant indirect effect 
exists. 
 
27 Pre-testers of the instrument indicated that they were somewhat angry at the auditors for proposing a 
large income-decreasing adjustment. However, as noted above, it was annoyance and frustration that had 
the highest median.  
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TABLE 4.3 
Responses to Post-Experimental Questions 
 
Panel A:  Mean Responses to Affect Measuresa 
Item                 Response 
1.   Angry (Ryan made you feel…)  1.35 
2.   Annoyed (Ryan made you feel…)  2.71 
3.   Sad (Ryan made you feel…)  1.19 
4.   Happy (Ryan made you feel…)  0.66 
5.   Frustrated (Ryan made you feel…)     2.70 
6.   Angry (The auditors (entire team) made you feel…)  2.29 
7.   Annoyed (The auditors (entire team) made you feel…)  3.49 
8.   Sad (The auditors (entire team) made you feel…)  1.48 
9.   Happy (The auditors (entire team) made you feel…)  0.76 
10. Frustrated (The auditors (entire team) made you feel…)  3.57 
 
Panel B:  Mean Agreement with Statements Regarding the Junior Auditor and Audit 
Teamb 
Item                 Responsec 
1.   I found Ryan to be likable.  5.30* 
2.   Ryan is intelligent.  5.75*** 
3.   Ryan is competent.  5.90*** 
4.   Ryan is credible.  5.84*** 
5.   The auditors are competent.      6.13*** 
6.   The auditors are credible.  6.11*** 
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7.   Responding well to Ryan was important to me.   6.97*** 
8.   I felt obligated to answer Ryan’s questions thoroughly.  7.13*** 
9.   Ryan’s questions affected my opinion about the inventory  5.28 
      obsolescence write-down. 
10. Ryan was disrespectful.  2.31*** 
11. I would want to work with Ryan again.  5.66*** 
12. I would want to work with this audit firm again.  5.32* 
13. I felt the auditor’s proposed reduction of the inventory   5.64*** 
      balance was unfair. 
 
Panel C:  Technology Usage 
 
Item                 Response 
How often do you engage in each of these activities?d 
1.   Sending and receiving text messages on a cell phone  2.62 
      for professional purposes. 
2.   Sending and receiving text messages on a cell phone  4.17 
      to communicate with friends. 
3.   Using instant messaging (on a computer) for professional  2.21 
      purposes. 
4.   Using instant messaging (on a computer) to communicate  1.79 
      with friends. 
5.   Using Twitter.        0.69 
6.   Using Facebook.  2.39 
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What percentage of the time do you use each [of the following] method[s] to 
communicate with others in a professional context?e 
1.   Face to face (in person)   34.95% 
2.   Video (e.g. Skype)  2.04% 
3.   Phone (land-line or cell phone)  20.47% 
4.   E-mail  34.62% 
5.   Instant message or text message  7.92% 
What percentage of the time would you prefer to receive a request for information via 
each of the following communication methods in a professional context?e 
1.   Face to face (in person)   35.31% 
2.   Video (e.g. Skype)  2.85% 
3.   Phone (land-line or cell phone)  17.85% 
4.   E-mail  37.09% 
5.   Instant message or text message  6.90% 
__________________ 
Notes: 
a This panel reports responses to several affective measures related to Ryan Miller (the junior auditor) 
and the overall audit team. The measure asked participants to indicate the extent to which either Ryan 
or the auditors made them feel a certain affective response. This was measured on a 0 to 10 scale 
anchored with “Not at all” and “Very much.”  
b   This panel reports the level of agreement with various statements related to the Ryan Miller (the junior 
auditor) and the overall audit team. The scale was a 9 point scale anchored with “Strongly disagree” 
and “Strongly Agree.” The mid-point (5) was labeled with “Neither agree nor disagree.” 
c For this section, asterisks indicate that the mean response was different from the neutral midpoint: 
***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, all 2-tailed. 
d Responses were on a 6 point scale anchored with 0 = Never and 5 = Very often. 
e Reported amounts are the mean percentage out of 100. Participants apportioned 100% to the five 
different communication modes in each of these cases.  
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Panel B presents the participants’ level of agreement with various statements 
related to Ryan and the auditors. The responses were on 9 point scales anchored with 
Strongly disagree and Strongly agree, with the mid-point (5) marked “Neither agree nor 
disagree.” Assessments of Ryan’s personal characteristics (likability, intelligence, 
competence, and credibility) did not significantly vary across conditions, demonstrating 
that personal opinions regarding Ryan did not drive differences based on mode or tone. 
Of particular interest, there were no differences across cells in response to the statement 
“Ryan was disrespectful.” This was important because one of the aspects of 
professionalism manipulated in the more vs. less professional conditions was the 
presence of polite courtesies (e.g., saying “please”, see Jessmer and Anderson 2001). 
This did not lead to differences in perceived respect, which could also affect outcomes.  
The experiment also appears to have been successful in motivating participants to 
view the task as important. In response to the statements “Responding well to Ryan was 
important to me” and “I felt obligated to answer Ryan’s questions thoroughly,” both 
mean responses were well above the midpoint (mean = 6.97 and 7.13, respectively). 
These did not vary across experimental conditions, demonstrating that the differences in 
net items revealed were not driven by the participants’ views of the importance of the 
task.  
Also, in response to the statement “Ryan’s questions affected my opinion about 
the inventory obsolescence write-down,” the mean response only marginally differed 
from the midpoint marked “neither agree nor disagree” (t=1.65, p=.10, 2-tailed). 
Interestingly, there was a difference based on professional tone (F=4.52, p=.035). 
Specifically, those in the more professional condition were less likely to agree with this 
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statement. Although there was not a significant ANOVA interaction term, the effects 
appeared to be driven by the e-mail condition. However, the pattern is not consistent with 
the pattern of net items revealed, suggesting that this is not an explanatory variable. 
Further, the results for net items revealed do not qualitatively change when including 
agreement with this statement as a covariate, nor is it a significant covariate. 
Regarding willingness to work with Ryan or the audit firm again, both were above 
the midpoint, although they were slightly more likely to want to work with Ryan again 
than the audit firm (mean 5.66 vs. 5.32, respectively. Paired-samples t-test: t=2.58, 
p=.011, 2-tailed). However, this did not vary across experimental conditions. This was 
likely a reaction to the proposed adjustment, which is consistent with the mean agreement 
with the statement, “I felt the auditor’s proposed reduction of the inventory balance was 
unfair,” which was above the midpoint (mean=5.64, t=3.80, p<.001). There was no 
difference across cells. I also ran a regression including the response to this statement 
about the fairness of the adjustment along with net items revealed on agreement with the 
auditor. The relationship of net items revealed on agreement with the auditor remained 
significant (t=2.22, p=.028) and the assessment of unfairness was highly significant  
(t=-7.14, p<.001). This feeling of unfairness, however, could not be a mediator of the 
indirect effect of communication mode and professional tone on agreement with the 
auditor, since there is no relationship between mode or tone with perceived unfairness.  
I asked various questions about technology use. Participants were asked how 
often they use certain communication methods for professional or personal use on a six 
point scale anchored with 0=Never and 5=Very often. They were then asked to allocate 
the percent of time that they use certain communication modes for professional purposes 
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and what percent of time they would prefer to receive a request for information via 
specific modes of communication (e.g., F2F, e-mail, phone).  
The mean responses can be seen in Panel C of Table 4.3. As would be expected 
based on random assignment, there were generally no differences in tech usage across 
conditions.28 The responses reveal certain characteristics of the participants in this 
experiment. For example, they are not generally using “cutting edge” communication 
methods for professional purposes. Instant messaging and text messaging were not often 
used professionally (means of 1.79 and 2.62, respectively), although they do use text 
messaging often for personal purposes (mean = 4.17). They confirm the lack of 
professional use by saying they use instant messaging or text messaging for professional 
purposes only 7.92% of the time on average. In terms of the amount of time that they use 
F2F for professional communication vs. e-mail (34.95% vs. 34.62%, respectively), these 
were statistically equal (paired samples t-test, t=0.14, p=.888, 2-tailed).  
Interestingly, demonstrating that the sample was not made up of people who are 
resistant to receiving an e-mail request, when asked what percentage of the time they 
would prefer to receive a request for information via each communication method, e-mail 
was apportioned the highest percentage (37.09%), although it was statistically equal to 
F2F (35.3%, paired samples t-test, t=0.55, p=.584, 2-tailed).  
Finally, I asked several questions related to power distance, to determine if higher 
power distance scores led to a greater reaction to the norm violation. As would be 
                                                            
28 One exception was there was a main effect of tone on the reported percentage of time that participants 
claimed to use F2F for professional communication purposes (F=4.15, p=.043). When the auditor’s request 
was less professional, participants indicated they use F2F less (approximately 32% of the time, vs. 38% of 
the time for the more professional). This is not a significant covariate when included in the ANOVA of the 
effects of communication mode and professional tone on net items revealed, nor does its inclusion 
qualitatively affect the results.   
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expected based on random assignment, there were no differences across experimental 
conditions for power distance. I ran an exploratory factor analysis of the four power 
distance questions. As expected, the questions loaded on two factors, which approximate 
“how it is [in my organization]” and “how it ought to be” (see House et al. 2004). The 
former indicates how the participants perceive current conditions in their organization, 
while the latter measures their personal attitudes towards how much power distance 
should exist. The first factor (how it is) was not a significant covariate in the ANOVA of 
communication mode and professional tone on net items revealed. The second factor 
(how it ought to be) is a marginally significant covariate (F=3.22, p=.074), but it does not 
qualitatively affect the relationships of communication mode or professional tone with 
net items revealed.  
In summary, none of the post-experimental questions appear to indicate that 
anything other than assessments of professionalism are driving the professional tone 
differences. Additionally, none of the post-experimental questions provide alternative 
explanations for the differences in reactions to the communication mode of the request.  
 
Summary 
In summary, my results support my hypotheses that an e-mail request leads to 
responses that are more biased towards items that support the client’s position as 
compared to audio and visual requests and a less professional tone leads to a more biased 
response as compared to a more professional tone, and this may be exacerbated in the e-
mail condition and/or attenuated in the audio and visual conditions. Study 2 provides 
evidence that the reaction to the difference in professional tone is due to a perceived 
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norm violation, as inexperienced individuals do not notice the difference in professional 
tone and do not differ in response to a less professionally worded e-mail request vs. a 
more professionally worded e-mail request, while the more experienced individuals do 
differ in their responses.  
The second phase of the experiment demonstrates the importance of eliciting 
information directly from the client, as the participants were less likely to agree with the 
auditor’s adjustment if they previously provided a more biased response. Further, they 
were less likely to accept the adjustment outright and were more likely to negotiate with a 
lower counteroffer and a lower maximum acceptable adjustment if they previously 
provided a more biased response.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results of this study suggest that there are ramifications to a junior auditor’s 
choice of communication media. Specifically, I find that clients provide responses that 
are more biased towards items that support their position when responding to an e-mail 
inquiry vs. an audio or visual inquiry. Further, an inquiry in a less professional tone also 
leads to a more biased response, and this effect may be exacerbated in the e-mail 
condition and appears to be the result of a perceived norm violation. In addition, if clients 
previously provided a more biased response, they are less likely to agree with a proposed 
audit adjustment and they are likely to negotiate more aggressively in response to a 
proposed income-decreasing audit adjustment. These findings are particularly important 
since staff auditors are likely to default to e-mail in order to avoid uncomfortable 
interactions with senior auditors (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). While Bennett and Hatfield 
found that junior auditors are more willing to request additional information via e-mail, 
the current research suggests that this benefit may be attenuated or detrimental overall. In 
particular, Trompeter and Wright (2010) raise concerns that auditors inadequately search 
for evidence that disconfirms client responses to auditor inquiries. However, even if the 
auditors do find the information through alternative audit procedures, increased client 
resistance to a resulting proposed income-decreasing adjustment could lead towards a 
less conservative final adjustment.  
Accordingly, there are several recommendations that arise from this research. 
First, audit firms need to be aware of the potential effects of using e-mail for client 
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inquiries and firms should alert auditors to these effects. Also, this research underscores 
the importance of adequate training and attention to professional communication skills, 
and for educating staff auditors about the potential effects of communicating in a less 
professional manner. In fact, the CPA Vision Project (2011) lists communication skills as 
a core competency, referring to the importance of “appropriate delivery and interpersonal 
skills” (p. 11). The results of this study demonstrate the essential nature of appropriate 
communication skills.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Like all experimental research, this study is subject to several limitations. In 
particular, I do not look at the effects of interactions between the auditor and the client. 
The back-and-forth of an actual conversation, whether with high temporal synchronicity 
as found in a phone or F2F conversation or low temporal synchronicity as found in an e-
mail conversation, could potentially have an effect. An alternative experimental approach 
could have been to use a confederate in the role of the junior auditor who could interact 
with the participants. However, this would create a challenge regarding extraneous 
factors that could affect experimental control (e.g., in certain conditions, the confederate 
could unintentionally provide additional cues to the participants regarding the 
appropriateness of their responses). The use of a video and audio recording was designed 
to control for extraneous factors that might have arisen through the use of a confederate, 
allowing for a cleaner test of direct causative effects of communication mode and 
professional tone.  
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Due to the need to keep the wording constant across communication modes, the 
current study precluded investigation of the effects of grammar errors or abbreviations 
commonly used in e-communications, as well as other informalities (cf. Carr and 
Stefaniak 2012). Future research can look into the effects of these writing styles.  
Another limitation of the study is that the clients had no indication of a pre-
existing relationship with the auditor. It is possible that a pre-existing relationship could 
mitigate or exacerbate the effects found in this study. For example, the communication 
model proposed by Swaab et al. (2012) suggests that a positive relationship could reduce 
differences between e-mail and F2F outcomes. Alternatively, a negative relationship may 
actually lead to e-mail resulting in a more cooperative response than F2F. However, one 
of the issues with junior auditors choosing to use e-mail for communications with clients 
is that they may fail to create a social relationship with clients. Audit partners have 
indicated during AAA conference panels and in private conversations that junior auditors 
may not be creating bonds with their clients as a result of defaulting to e-mail use. Many 
of these partners also indicate that they believe a positive social relationship can lead to a 
client revealing more information in response to audit inquiries. However, concerns arise 
regarding whether a stronger social relationship would reduce auditor skepticism towards 
information and explanations provided by the client. Future research could investigate 
interacting dyads of auditors and managers to test whether clients reveal more (and/or 
provide a less biased response) to an auditor after engaging in a social relationship-
building task, compared to those who do not develop a social relationship. Further, 
research can investigate if social relationships affect auditor skepticism with respect to 
the information provided.  
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Another avenue for future research involves the interesting finding that 42% of 
the participants in my study attempted to persuade the auditor that there was no inventory 
obsolescence problem. This was interesting since participants were not asked their 
opinion on obsolescence, but were only asked to provide information. Client attempts to 
persuade auditors to their position could have a detrimental effect on auditor skepticism 
and potentially on audit outcomes. Accordingly, future research could include 
investigating inquiry techniques that may reduce client persuasion attempts. For example, 
there may be ways an auditor can ask for information in which the clients focus more on 
the task of providing information as opposed to focusing on persuading the auditor to 
agree with a certain position.  
Additional research could look at the effects of different incentives on clients’ 
propensity to reveal information. If auditors are aware of clients’ incentives (e.g., bonuses 
or stock options, or fear of job loss), the auditors may consider changing their inquiry 
approach. Finally, recent research suggests the importance of investigating non-financial 
information during an audit (Brazel et al. 2009). Future research could look at whether 
inquiry should differ with respect to financial and non-financial personnel, including 
investigating ways to improve the non-financial information set provided by clients.  
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APPENDIX 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 
The experiment was conducted online using the Qualtrics survey platform. 
Participants could only go back to previous screens when a “back” button was provided. 
The following pages have screen shots of each screen in the instrument. For the videos, 
issues with screen image capture have resulted in the appearance that some images are 
not centered in the video screen. However, the actual videos were properly centered in 
Qualtrics. Also, on the following pages some larger screens do not show borders at either 
the top or the bottom. Again, this is only a function of the screen capture process, and is 
not indicative of issues in the actual instrument. Titles and descriptions (where necessary) 
are provided above the screen shots.  
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ENTRY SCREEN/INFORMED CONSENT 
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CALIBRATION SCREEN 
This screen included a video that showed a test pattern. The picture shows the video in 
progress. 
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INTRODUCTION SCREEN 
 
In this screen, the auditor says, “My name is Ryan Miller and I’m working on the audit of 
inventory.” The picture shows the video in progress. The actual video is appropriately 
centered. 
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SECOND INTRODUCTION SCREEN 
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COMPANY BACKGROUND SCREEN 
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SECOND COMPANY BACKGROUND SCREEN 
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SELECTED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SCREEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
FIRST INVENTORY-RELATED ISSUES SCREEN 
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SECOND INVENTORY-RELATED ISSUES SCREEN 
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TRANSITION SCREEN (DEPENDENT ON CONDITION) 
 
Participants in the e-mail condition see the following: 
 
 
 
Participants in the audio condition see the following: 
 
 
 
Participants in the visual condition see the following: 
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AUDITOR REQUEST SCREEN – E-MAIL/MORE PROFESSIONAL 
CONDITION  
 
Participants in the e-mail/more professional condition see the following:  
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AUDITOR REQUEST SCREEN – E-MAIL/LESS PROFESSIONAL CONDITION  
 
Participants in the e-mail/less professional condition see the following:  
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AUDITOR REQUEST SCREEN – AUDIO CONDITION 
 
Participants in the audio condition see the following. The audio track is the exact audio 
from the visual condition. The auditor says the same words as the e-mail condition, 
varying by professional tone condition.  
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AUDITOR REQUEST SCREEN – VISUAL CONDITION 
 
Participants in the visual condition see the following. The picture shows the video in 
progress. The auditor says the same words as the e-mail condition, varying by 
professional tone condition.  
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RESPONSE SCREEN 
 
The participant types their response in the text box below. The box automatically spell-
checks their response and saves the response in case they accidentally close the window. 
The links open the previously shown screens in separate browser windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
89 
 
AUDITOR-PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT SCREEN – FIRST HALF 
This is the top half of the screen revealing the auditor-proposed adjustment. The second 
half follows on the next page.  
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AUDITOR-PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT SCREEN  – SECOND HALF 
This is the second half of the auditor-proposed adjustment screen. The links open the 
previous information in separate browser windows.  
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NEGOTIATION RESPONSE SCREEN 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – AFFECT QUESTIONS 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – PERCEPTIONS OF RYAN AND THE 
AUDITORS – FIRST SCREEN 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – PERCEPTIONS OF RYAN AND THE 
AUDITORS – SECOND SCREEN 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – PROFESSIONALISM AND AGE 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – TECHNOLOGY USE – FIRST HALF 
OF SCREEN 
This is the first half of this screen. The second half follows on the next page.  
 
 
  
97 
 
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – TECHNOLOGY USE – SECOND HALF 
OF SCREEN 
This is the second half of this screen. As participants enter numbers, the total is computed 
automatically and the screen cannot advance until the responses total to 100% for each 
question. 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – SURVEY, INCLUDING POWER 
DISTANCE QUESTIONS – FIRST HALF OF SCREEN 
This is the first half of this screen. The second half follows on the next page.  
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS – SURVEY, INCLUDING POWER 
DISTANCE QUESTIONS – SECOND HALF OF SCREEN 
This is the second half of this screen. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SCREEN 
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